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THE WAK WITH MEXICO, 



SPEECH 



HON. LEWIS CASS, OF MICHIGAN, 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, JANUARY 3, 1847. 

On the Bill reported from the Committee on Military Jlffahs to raise, for a limited 
time, an additional Military Force. 



Mr. CASS said: 

Mr. President: This is the first of a series of bills, which the Military 
Committee is about to present to the Senate. They have commenced with the 
most important, and will ask the consideration of the others, in succession, till 
they have discharged the duty intrusted to them. 

In presenting this bill, I do not propose to touch any of the disputed topics, 
which divide the two great parties, under the banner of one or the other of 
which, every citizen of our country is arrayed. I shall leave these, if introduced 
at all, to be introduced by others. I had hoped, till I heard the incidental dis- 
cussion, which arose a day or two since, on the question of taking up this bill, 
that these exciting subjects would be postponed for some future opportunity, 
and that the pi'opositions now submitted would be considered upon their military 
merits, taking it for granted, that the propriety of voting the additional ibrQe 
required, would not be controverted. I was well aware, that we could not escap' 
a full discussion of the origin of the war, its progress, its objects, and the whr' 
course of the Administration, connected with it. Nor indeed did I wish to avi 
it. However severe may be the attack, I trust it will be as earnestly met, a 
easily repelled, for I considei' the ground, which the Administration occupies 
perfectly impregnable. I am apprehensive, howev^er, from the remarks, wh 
fell from some of the honorable Senators the other day, that the whole field of 
controversy is to be gone over, and that we are to fight this bill, necessary, as I 
deem its immediate passage to the ])ublic interests, inch by inch, till al! the ?reat 
party questions of the day are debated and exhausted. If it is to b ^ so, 1 ni ^^!. 
of course submit; but the fault shall not be mine, nor will I provoke the con- 
test by introducing any topics, which may properly lead to it. 

There is one point, sir, where we all can meet, and that is the gallantry and 
good conduct of our army. This is one of the high places, to which we can 
come up together, and, laying aside our party dissensions, mingle our congratu- 
lations that our country has had such sons to go forth to battle, and that they 
have gathered such a harvest of renown in distant fields. 

The time has been — and there are those upon this floor who remember it 
well — when our national flag was said to be but striped bunting, and our armed 
vessels but fir-built frigates. The feats of our army and navy during our last 
war with England redeemed us from this reproach, the offspring of foreign 
jealousy ; and had they not, the events of the present war would have changed 
these epithets into terras of honor ; for our flag has become a victorious stand- 
ard, borne by marching columns, over die hills and valleys, and through the 
cities, and towns, and fields of a powerful nation, in a career of success, of which 
few examples can fJfe found in ancient or in modeni warfare. 

Printed at the Congressional Globe Office 



The movement of our army from Puebla was one of the most romantic and 
remarkable events, which ever occurred in the mihtary annals of any country. 

Our troops did not indeed burn their fleet, like the first conquerors of Mexico, 
for they needed not to gather courage from despair, nor to stimulate their reso- 
lution, by destroying all hopes of escape. But they voluntarily cut off all means 
of communication with their own country, by throwing themselves among the 
armed thousands of another, and advancing with stout hearts, but feeble num- 
bers, into the midst of a hostile territory The uncertainty which rested on the 
public mind, and the anxiety everywhere felt, when our gallant little army 
disappeared from our view, will not be forgotten during the present generation. 
There was a universal pause of expectation — hoping, but still fearing; and the 
eyes of twenty millions of people were anxiously fixed upon another country, 
which a little band of its armed citizens had invaded. A veil concealed them 
from our view. They were lo^t to us for fifty days, for that period elapsed, 
from the time when we heard of their departure from Puebla, till accounts 
reached us of the issue of the movement. The shroud which enveloped them 
then gave way, and we discovered our glorious flag, waving in the breezes of 
the capital, and the city itself invested by our army. 

And similar circumstances marked the very commencement of the war, when 
the Mexicans first sunounded our troops, and shut them out from all communi- 
cation with their country. This unexpected attack struck us all with astonish- 
ment, and we feared, as well we might, that numbers would overcome discipline 
and valor, which, however they might prolong, could not be expected to succeed 
in, the contest. And hopeless indeed might'have been the result, had not the 
honored soldier, who commanded our troops, had confidence in them, and they 
in him — had he not known how to lead, and they to follow. And well and 
bravely did they all bear themselves in the critical circumstances, which surround- 
ed them; and our doubts soon gave way to certainty, and gloomy forebodings 
to Morious convictions. And the campaign thus commenced was vigorously 
followed up on the Rio Grande, and victory after victory, till the crowning 
triumph at Buena Vista, was heralded by every breeze, and became familiar to 
our ears as household words. 

During the whole of this war, there has been a series of successes, which has 
been uninterrupted by a single serious disaster. I hold in my hand a table, 
\jrepared at the Adjutant General's Office, from the best materials, which can 
be found there, exhibiting the actions fought with the enemy, and the forces 
em^a^ed, and the losses sustained by each party. As we have official data, the 
true losses on our side are stated ; but those on the side of the Mexicans are in 
some instances entirely omitted, and in others conjecturally estimated. This 
table shows the whole truth, so far as we are concerned, and but a part of the 
truth, so far as the enemy is concerned. Still, even under these circumstances, it 
is one of the proudest trophies, with which any army ever enriched its country.* 

The Adjutant General remarks, that he cannot vouch for the perfect accuracy 
of the above statements, as from their nature they must often be estimated. 
He adds, that the above table, although essentially correct, is not entirely com- 
plete, for he thinks there are yet wanting some reports, he, of affairs, which 
have been lost or intercepted, and it may be, that the above statement may 
hereafter need amendment or correction. 

If we recorded our history upon stone, as was done in the primitive ages of 
the world, we should engrave this series of glorious deeds upon tables of marble. 
But we shall do better ; we shall engrave it upon our hearts, and we shall 
conimit it to the custody of the press, whose monuments, frail and feeble as 
they appear, yet from their wonderful power of multiplication, are more endu- 

* See Table on page 8. 



ring than brass or marble, than statues or pyramids, or the proudest monuments, 
erected by human hands. 

Let it be remembered, sir, that these battles were fought in a great measure 
by new and undisciplined troops, hastily collected at home, and rapidly marched 
to the seot of warfare ; by men who had abandoned the duties and comforts of 
domestic life, and who made war, not a trade as in Europe, but a temporary 
employment, in order to defend the interest and honor of their country. And 
even the small regular army, which existed at the commencement of the war, 
had seen jitde actual service in the field, and that not with a civilized foe, but 
in murderous conflicts with Indian tribes, where there was much exposure to 
meet, and little glory to gain. Many of the officers and soldiers, and indeed a 
great majority of them, and some of the conmianders too, saw the first hostile gun 
fired in the very field, which they illustrated by their deeds, and moistened with 
their blood. Honor, then, to the highest and the lowest, to the greatest and 
the least. Honor to the living and the dead ; to those who survive to enjoy it, 
and to the memory of those Avho sleep in a soldier's grave, far from the land 
they loved so welL 

And, happy am I to see upon this floor, at this moment particularly, one of 
the gallant officers, who have inscribed their names high upon the military roll 
of their country ; and there are others like him, in this city, who have returned 
from the campaign, in which they distinguished themselves, bearing upon their 
persons inefl^aceable marks of courage and patriotism. A kind Providence has 
permitted them to come back, and the plaudit of grateful millions, Well done, 
good and faithfid servants, is the proud welcome which greets them. 

Let modern philanthropists talk as they please, the instincts of nature are 
truer than the doctrines they preach. Military renown is one of the great 
elements of national strength, as it is one of the proudest sources of gratifica- 
tion to every man, v/ho loves his country, and desires to see her occupy a distin- 
guished position among the nations of the earth. 

I should have been proud to have been in Europe during our military 
operations in Mexico — proud to witness the efiect of the skill and prowess of 
our army upon the statesmen and politicians and communities of the Old World. 
During the course of these events, there was no war there to attract the general 
attention, and to excite, by its uncertainties and vicissitudes, the solicitude of 
the governments. Our war was the event of the day, and many a steadfast gaze 
was cast across the Atlantic, to watch the prospects and progress of the pattern 
Republic, as we are invidiously termed, in the new career into which we had 
entered. - As we all know, our institutions have friends and foes in the other 
hemisphere. To both, they are a light shining across the ocean, but inviting 
some, and warning others, as the impressions our experiment has produced have 
been favorable or unfavorable. 

The anti-republican croakers of the Old World, at the commencement of our 
Government, predicted, that it could rrot long resist the shocks of peace or war. 
When they found it could do both, and do it successfully, they then denied our 
power to carry on a war without our own boundaries, should circumstances 
require such an exertion of national strength. This was our first great trial ; 
for in the invasion of Canada, during the last war, the operations were so near, 
that they did not test our strength for distant warfare. The trial has been 
made, and has succeeded. No one will hereafter call in question our capacity 
to assert our rights, wherever these may require our interference. If the o-reat 
experiment had failed, it would have taken ages to recover from the misfortune. 
But now, wherever the American flag is borne, or the name of American 
known, and that wherever, is everywhere,~tRe^glorious feats of this war have 



4 

proclaimed our power, and have announced, that we have taken our position 
side by side with the mightiest nations of the world. Hereafter, in the wildest 
dreams of ambition, there will be no dream of conquering us ; nor will any 
hostile foot pollute our shore, but to escape from it, if it can, as best it may. 

The present hill provides for raising ten additional regiments of infantry, to 
serve during the war. The average number of each regiment in the field, is 
rather less than three-fourths of the legal establishment ; so that this measure, 
if adopted, will add about seven thousand five hundred men to the army. The 
organization is precisely that provided in the act, which passed at the last session 
of Congress for raising an additional force ; and as the details were then fully con- 
sidered, and are well known to the Senate, I need not recapitulate them here. 

The reasons, which render this increase of force necessary, are so clearly and 
forcibly stated in the report of the Secretary of War, that I need do little more 
than request, that that portion of the document may be read. 

The following extract from the report of the Secretary of War, was then read 
by the Secretary: 

" Our career of success, so disastrous to Mexico ; our conquest of so many of her States and 
territories ; tiic subjugation and occupation of her capital ; the defeat and disjiersion of her armiesv 
the capture of most of her inutcr'iel of war, and the annihilation of her former commerce, have 
not yet brought peace, or the offer of such terms as could be accepted by the United States 
without national degradation. The war still continues; and it is proper to present some sug- 
gestions in regard to its further prosecution. In making these suggestions, I pass, without 
remark, tlie proposition that we should abandon all our acquisitions, and witlidraw our troops 
from the enemy's country. Such a proposition could only be seriously entertained if we were 
in reality the vanquished party, and were convinced of our inability to prolong the contest 
with reasonable hopes of success. 

*' Our further operations must, in my opinion, be conducted in one of the three following 
modes : first, to take and hold an indemnity line, to recede from all places and positions now 
occupied in advance of it, and cease from all aggressive operations beyond that line ; second, to 
overrun the whole country, and hold all the principal places in it by permanent garrisons ; and, 
third, to retain what wc now possess, open the lines of communication into the interior, and 
extend our operations to other important places, as our means and the prospect of advantages 
shall indicate — keeping a disposable force always ready, within approachable limits, to annoy 
the enemy, to seize supplies, enforce contributions, and frustrate his efforts to collect means and 
assemble troops for the purpose of proti-acting the war. 

" A full discussion of the comparative merits of these modes of conducting our military oper- 
ations would extend this communication to an unwarrantable length ; I shall, therefore, confine 
my remarks to a few prominent considerations relative to each. 

" With reference to a speedy peace, with proper indemnity and security — the only object of 
the war — the line policy is regarded as objectionable. If our present position cannot command 
acceptable terms of pacification from iVlexico, retiring to an indemnity line would certainly fail 
to produce such a result; it would weaken the inducements of the enemy to put an end to lios- 
thities. Restored, by our voluntary surrender, to the possession of his capital and important 
departments, and relieved from the pressui-e of our arms, and from all apprehensions of further 
conquest and annoyance, beyond the limits we might select, he would be lel"t with more abundant 
resources than he now possesses tc*jirepare, at leisure and in security, to strike an etTectivc blow 
with concentrated forces at our detached posts. To hold tiicse posts safely, to retain possession 
of the seaports we now have, (if that should fall within the policy,) and to prevent incursions 
into the territories which we might choose to appropriate to ourselves, would, in my opinion, 
require a force as large as would suflice to maintain what we now occupy, and to carry our 
operations still further in the interior of the enemy's country, and make him feel the calamities 
of" war in a way best calculated to induce him to seek for peace. But if in this I am mistaken, 
and the line policy should enable us to reduce the number of our troops, still, it will not, as 1 
conceive, thereby effect a reduction of our actual expenditures for the war. 

" In consequence of the interruption of intercourse between the seaports in our possession 
and the central parts of Mexico, the collections on imports have hitherto been inconsiderable. 
If the line policy is adopted, this intercourse will continue to be interrupted, and, consequently, 
the receipts of revenue from this source will be small. 

"Under the operation of the line policy, all expectations of lessening the burden of sustaining 
our troops, by deriving supjilies and contributions from the enemy, would be disappointed. 
The supplies in the vicinity of our posts would be withdrawn from our reach, as soon as our 
design to seize and appropriate them was ascertained or suspected. But, were it otherwise, as 
our posts would be remote from the wealth and resources of the country, the amount which 
could be obtained would be inconsiderable. 

"So far from deriving advantage from the line policy, by way of obtaining assistance from 
the resources of the enemy, towards the support of our troops, we should, I apprehend, confer 
upon a portion of lire people of Mexico a direct benefit, by opening to them at our posts a market, 



in which we should become the purchasers of tlicir products at an exorbitant price. These 
considerations, without bringing into view others, have led me to look to one of the other modes 
of operation I have mentioned, as preferable to tiiat of occupying an indemnity line. 

" In regard to the second mode suggested — that of occupying the whole country — the wide 
extent of territory embraced in the Mexican Republic, the many important points to be garri- 
soned, and the long lines of communication to be kept open, present difficulties of no ordinary 
magnitude, if our occupancy is to be of such a character as to supersede the Mexican authority, 
and recjuire the temporary establishment of civil government. In carrying this plan into effect, 
it would not be i-easonable to rely upon the favorable disposition, or even neutrality, of any 
considerable part of tlie Mexican people, until some assurance of the stability of our power was 
derived from its continuance. Our posts must therefore be strong, and our forces numerous, 
in order to secure the many and long lines of communication, to disperse and chastise the 
guerrilla bands which would obstruct them, and to suppress the more powerful aspirings of the 
people wherever they may be attempted. I cannot safely estimate the force requisite to carry 
into full effect this plan, at less than seventy thousand men. To ensure the presence of that 
number in tiie enemy '.s country, and at places where they would be wanted, it would be neces- 
sary to raise a much larger force. The great expense of raising, organizing, and sending to 
their remote destination so large a body of troops as soon as needed, to give effect to tliis plan, 
would, I apprehend, bring a very heavy, and perhaps embarrassing, demand upon the treasury. 

" The third mode presented is, in my judgment, preferable to the others. Beyond certain 
limits, it admits of expansion and contraction; but, as a fixed condition, all now held is to be 
retained, and no part surrendered, but in compliance with treaty stipulations. Tliis plan also 
contemplates further acquisitions extending to other important points, more or less numerous, 
as circumstances may warrant. 

" Notwitlistanding our victories jiave fallen with crushing weight upon the assembled armies 
of Mexico, most of those who hold in their hands the decision of the question of peace, have 
stood beyond the range of the physical evils inflicted by the war. By extending the theatre of 
it, and changing the mode of conducting it, they can be made to feel its pressure. In conse- 
quence of our liberal and humane policy, we have, as yet, scarcely touched the substance of the 
wealthy and influential classes in Mexico. ,As the Mexican army has long been to them the 
instrument of oppression in the hands of their successive rulers, its destruction has not deCf'^ly 
enlisted their sympathies, or alarmed their fears. Our army has afforded them better protection 
than their own; and thus, by our ])resence and our forbearance, they have, within certain limits, 
hitherto escaped exactions from either. But our successes have now opened the way to act 
upon and influence those who probably can, if they will, put an end to hostilities. By making 
them sufler the usual calamities of war, they must be made to desire peace. 

" In addition to the troops required to garrison places to be retained, it is proposed to have 
in the field a competent force for aggressive operations; to strike the enemy whenever he may 
present a vulnerable point; to open avenues from the ports in our possession into the enemy's 
country; and to cover and to subject to our control some of his rich mining districts and produc- 
tive agricultural regions. It is not deemed proper to point out in more detail the movements 
and objects contemplated in the further prosecution of the war upon this plan." 

Assuming that this plan of operations recommended by the Secretary of War 
is the true one, (and, for myself, I have no doubt upon that subject.) we have 
then four great objects to be kept in view, in estunating the force to be pro- 
vided for the future conduct of the war : 

1. The continued occupation of the important positions, we now hold. 

2. The taking possession of such other commanding points, as experience 
may show to be proper, and as the circumstances of the war may require. 

3. The preservation of the necessary cominunication between our positions, 
as well from the sea-coast to the capital, as in other portions of the country, 
which may be brought into subjection to us. 

4. A strong force, independent of what is necessary for these purposes, which 
shall always be kept upon the alert, and ready to move, whenever there may 
be any appearance of an outbreak on the part of the Mexican peoj)le. 

The organization and maintenance of a large force may be the means of 
rendering its employment unnecessary. It is much better to render opposition 
hopeless, by the display of strength, than to excite it into action, by the exhibi- 
tion of weakness, and then to be compelled to resort to desperate struggles, to 
remedy evils, which ordinary prudence would have prevented. It is true 
humanity also, and we owe it to ourselves, to our army, who have done and 
suffered so much, to the enemy, and to the world. Remember, sir, that our 
troops are three thousand miles from home, in the midst of a hostile population 
of eight or ten millions, and that, by great exertions and unparalleled bravery, 



6 

they have succeeded In a partial subjugation of the country. But we have no 
right again to expose them to such perils. There is a vast superiority of physi- 
cal force opposed to them. All experience shows, that in this condition an 
invaded people will suddenly break out into insurrections, and sometimes display 
an energy and courage, which they failed to exhibit upon the battle-field. 
Who would weigh with a critical balance the amount of opposition we have to 
apprehend, and the strength necessary to overcome it, and then coolly provide 
this calculated force, and leave events to take care of themselves? What kind 
of political arithmetic would that be, which would say, if so many troops have 
done so much, how many will it require to do so much more ? I trust, that the 
supplies we may vote, will be given upon a far better principle: upon a prin- 
ciple, which shall look, indeed, to results, but which shall make the most liberal 
arrangements for attaining them. 

The proceedings of this Government are as well known in Mexico as here. 
They do not indeed travel upon the wings of the wind, but they travel with 
the power of the press, and are spread through the civilized world. Vigorous 
and prompt action will produce the happiest etfect upon the state of things in 
Mexico. Nothing would conduce more to impress upon the people of that 
country the necessity of a peace, than a unanimous determination in Congress 
to put forth all the strength of the nation till it is obtained. 

1 have caused the following abstract to be prepared from the report of the 
Adjutant General, exhibiting the entire strength of our present army, including 
regulars and volunteers : 

Volunteers — actual force, about 20,000 

To complete tiie organization will require 12,500 

Twenty-five regiments of regulars — full legal complement, exclusive of officers.. . 28,814 

Actual strength 21,533 

To complete the organization will require 7,281 

During the last year, there were recruited — 

For the old army 11,018 

For the new army 11,162 

Forces in the field under General Scott — 

Regulars 17,101 

Volunteers 15,055 

Aggregate 32,156 32,156 

Deduct the garrisons of Tampico and Vera Cruz - 1,947 

Makes, for all the operations between Vera Cruz and Mexico, including garri- 
sons, together with the sicl: and disabled - 30,209 

The returns in the Adjutant General's Office do not show the actual distribution 

of this force. 
Under General Taylor, but temnorarily commanded by General Wool — 

Regulars ', 3.937 

Volunteers 2,790 

Aggregate 6,727 C,727 

Under General Price, in New Mexico — 

Regulars 255 

Volunteers 2,902 

Aggregate 3,157 3,157 

On the Oregon route, under Lieutenant Colonel Powell, Fort Kearny — 

Volunteers - 477 

In California, under Colonel Mason — 

Regulars 216 

Volunteers .^ 803 

Aggregate ... 1,019 1,019 

Total land force employed in the prosecution of the war: 

Regulars 21 ,509 

Volunteers 22,027 

Aggregate 43,536 



It will be seen, that we have in Mexico, under General Scott, besides the 
garrisons of Tainpico and Vera Cruz, about 29,000 men, rank and file, exclu- 
ding officers; and in the command of General Taylor, an aggregate of 6,727 
men, officers included. 

From the statements of the Adjutant General, it appears that the actual 
force kept up is less, by one-fourth, than the legal force authorized by law. 
The continually renewing casualties of war, and other circumstances, occasion 
this difference. And it is not probable, that the existing legal establishment 
could, by any effort, be made to keep in the field a greater numerical strenffth, 
than is now there. So that if the force of the army is to be materially aug- 
mented, this must be done by the creation of new corps, and by multiplying 
the arrangements for procuring recruits and volunteers. I have omitted in this 
enumeration, some bodies of volunteers, which have been called out, but have 
not yet joined the- army. They cannot, if full, which it is not probable they 
will be, exceed 2,200 men, and do not ohange the question before us: if, indeed, 
they do more than keep up for a time the present number of volunteers in the field. 

I know nothing more of the proposed plan of the campaign, than is disclosed 
in that part of the report of the Secretary of War, which has just been read to 
the Senate. I do not therefore presume to speak authoritatively upon the sub- 
ject, and indeed it may well be, that no fixed system of operations has been or 
will be prescribed by the Executive; but that after expressing its general views, 
the conduct of the war will be left to the discretion of the commander. But it 
is easy to see, that if the obstinate injustice of the Mexicans drives us to greater 
exertions, and to a more enlarged sphere of operations, there are a number of 
positions which, from their importance, military or political, we must seize and 
hold. These can only be indicated by an exact knowledge of the country, and 
particularly of its great lines of communication, which must be commanded and 
guarded. 

And the mining countries would claim their share of attention, in the efforts 
we may be called on to make. The rich districts of Zacatecas and San Luis 
yet contribute their supplies to the reduced treasury of the enemv. 1 have 
seen within a few days a letter from one of the most gallant and distinguished 
generals in Mexico, which estimates the revenue now derived from the mines at 
an amount so much higher than I was prepared to expect, that I am unwilling 
to state it here, as I am not at liberty to name my authority. But if this infor- 
mation is correct, or near it, the product is a most important portion of the 
national resources, which should be diverted from the Mexican treasury to ours. 
And he also gives it as his decided opinion, that by proper arrangement and 
exertions, the produce of the taxes of the country may be made to bear the 
expenses of holding it in our possession. If so, and the same infatuation con- 
tinues to prevail in the Mexican councils, we can hold on, as indeed we must 
hold on, and let the enemy pay the cost of a state of things, whose existence is 
owing to themselves. Without the extinction of their independence, and the 
annexation of such a vast population to our country, with few sympathies to 
unite them to us, we can continue to govern them, and govern them with energy 
and justice, such as are new in their history, till the lessons of adversity shall 
have taught them to do us right, and till the experience of our sway and its 
operation around them, shall have brought them to a better state of feelino-. 
We can then treat with efficient rulers, and after securing the just objects of the 
war, we can retire, leaving the Mexican people in the enjoyment of their inde- 
pendence, with a salutary conviction, that it is better to secure our friendship 
by justice, that to provoke our enmity by insults and aggressions. 

The returns show that we have less than ^^000 men, rank and file, wliich 



8 

excludes officers, in the midst of a hostile population, of eight or ten millions, 
differing from us in race, in language, in religion, in institutions, in prejudices, 
and indeed in all the characteristics, which constitute national identity, and 
separate the great families of mankind from one another. This is exclusive of 
our force upon the Rio Grande, amounting to about 6,000 rank and file, and 
which is hardly large enough to hold that region in peaceable possession, and 
to guard against the irruption of the Mexican troops. And it may be that this 
force will need augmentation with a view to onward operations, either directly 
upon San Luis, or by the more circuitous but less difficult route of Zacatecas 
to the central countrifs of Nortiiern Mexico. 

He who believes that this principal force of 28,000 men, and this auxiliary 
force of 6,000, including the sick, invalids and disabled, are amply sufficient to 
hold in subjection the people already reduced to obedience, to carry the war 
further the longer it is protracted, and to meet its casualties, whether these are 
found in the battle-field, in the climate, or in popular tumults, may well vote 
against this bill, and refuse the augmentation it provides. But those, who, like 
me, believe th^t this Government, founded by all for the good of all, is bound 
by the most sacred obligations not to expose its citizens to unnecessary peril, 
nor to push their exertions to the very limit of human endurance, but to make 
the most liberal arrangements for the prosecution of the war, and to hold the 
treasure of the nation light as dust, when weighed in the balance with the life- 
blo. c! of iis suns, will cheerfully vote for this proposition, and hail its passage 
not only as u necessary measure of policy, but as a tribute to gallantry and 
patriotism. 



TABLE referred to on second page. 



JIffair or bultk 



^a^cd. 



\ Number of kiUed. 






= 11 



Uetaclimem under Captain Thorn- 
tun, '2il dragoons, in a reconnois- 
sanc-u on tlie Rio Grande, above 
Fort Brown, 'r<:xas 

Dt tucliuient of Captain Walker's 
Texa> Ranger:?, near Point Isabel, 

Fort Brown 

Palo Alto 

Resaca ile la Palma 

Monterey 

San Piisqual, Uppi-r California .... 

ISnizito, New Alexico 

lios Aimelos, California 

IjU Canada, i\ew Mexico 

Mora, New Mexico 

ri Knihndo 

I'uebla lie Taos 

Rnena Vista 

Sacramento 

Vera Cruz 

(Jcrro Gordo 

( 'alal(oso, California, De Russy . . . . 

( 'oiitreras 

Sau Antonio ^. . 

Chui ubusco 

( »n Major Lal!y"s march 

Molino del Key 

Cliapultepee 

Attack on Piiebla 

nuaniantla 

General Lane, Puebia 

Atlisco 



Total . 



April 25,1846 

April 28 

Mav 4 to May 9 . . . 

May S 

May 9 

Sept. 21,22,23.... 

Dec. 6 

Dec. 25 

.Tan. 8, 9,ia!7 

Jan. 24 

Jan. 24 

Jan. 29 

Feb. 4 

Feb. 22,23 

Feb. -28 

March U to 29..., 

April 18 

July 12 



VAug. 19,20 

Aug. 10 to 19 

Sept. a 

Sept. 11, 12,13.... 
Sept. 13 to Oct. 12, 

<)ct.9 

Oct. 12 

Oct. 19 



63 

.■?() 

2,300 

1,700 

6.645 

110 

rm 
rm 

350 



200 
ino 

4,000 
6,000 
6,500 
10,000 
160 
1.220 
'600 
1,500 



500; 700 

SOOi 800 
4,7.VJ, 20,000 

900! 4,000 
11,0001 5,,500 
8,500 12,000 

126 1,500 



8,497 

1,200 
3,251 
7,180 
1,400 
1,780 
3,100 
1,500 



32,000 

2,000 
14,000 
25,000 
8,000 
4,000 
4,000 
2,000 



10 unknown. 



10 unknown 
2: unknown 



4 

36 

120 

19 

1 
9 
1 

6 

267 

12 

8' 
15 

164 



9 

201 



100 
2<I0 
700 
unknown 
*200 
*80 
36 

20 

1.50 

*1,5(K) 

*600 

*.500 

*1,200 

200 



*4,000 

unknown 

*3,000 

178j unknown 

18i unknown 

141 161 



210 



l,07i 



* Killed and wounded. 



in 



Kumlicr of 
u-ounded. 



£Ji i. 



10 
42 
98 
368 
15 

14 
6 
3 
1 

4(i 

408 

5 

51 
353 

13 



74 

.')81 

673 

.5;t 

II 



3,669 



unknown. 

unknown, 
unknown, 

300 

400 
unknown, 
unknown. 



unknown, 

unknown, 
uiiknnwn. 

300 
a ^&>v. 

300 



1,.360 



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